The 1049/2001 regulation on access to Commission, European Parliament and Council documents, was due to be revised a decade ago. The revision process began with a proposal by the Commission in 2008. However, the negative response of the European Parliament signalled, what came to be a deadlocked process. This paper aims to unearth the underlying reasons for this deadlock by comparing the proposal of the Commission to the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in response to it. The resulting differences in both institutions' positions will serve to clarify their underlying motives for rejecting each other's proposals. The ultimate objective of this chapter is to shed light on the Commission and the European Parliament's attitudes towards transparency and the right to public access to documents within the European Union.
Introduction
On the 21 st of May 2013, a parliamentary session was held to discuss the deadlock on the revision of Then she went on to explain how access to documents was important to ensure transparency and in turn how transparency was crucial in making EU institutions accountable to EU citizens and lastly how this would increase the democratic credentials of the EU institutions.
Then, Ms. In't Veld turned to the Commission representative, to address him. However, it turned out that Borg had not been listening to Ms. In't Veld. He had removed the headphone providing translation, and had not listened to the speaker, suggesting he did not care about what the MEP thought and said on the issue. In't Veld was not amused and said: 'Chair, maybe you can ask or point out to the Commission that we're having a debate here. If they care to hear!'. The tone was clear. It was not friendly, and it had never been.
It has been a decade since the revision of Regulation 1049/2001 has been on the agenda, and no progress has been made. The Commission brought forward a new proposal in 2008. However, this proposal was extremely negatively received by the European Parliament (hereinafter 'EP') whose discontent was clearly expressed in its position. Indeed, in a resolution adopted by the EP on 15 December 2011 (which is still applicable at the time of writing in June 2018), the EP suggests more than 30 substantial amendments to the proposal put forward by the Commission. A comparison of the Commission proposal, on the one hand, and the EP's resolution on the other hand, helps us understand why reaching a consensus on a common instrument for public access to EU documents is proving so complicated.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the revision process of Regulation 1049/2001 by attempting to provide an explanation as to why the institutions have not agreed upon a viable solution yet.
More specifically, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: Why have the Commission and the European Parliament been unable to agree on the revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on the right to public access documents since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 until now?
The paper delves into three issues that are particularly problematic and that prevent the institutions to progress: (1) the overriding public interest test in relation to the exceptions laid down under Art. 4; (2) the relationship between the right to public access to documents and the right to data protection;
(3) the disclosure of documents originating from Member States. Methodologically, the paper combines juridical and political approaches.
The Commission's and the EP's positions are analysed because both are the central institutions involved in the legislative process and both made proposals for the revision of the Regulation. The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter 'CJEU'), has also played a central role in the revision process, as this paper argues. The institutions are expected to follow the case law (Blauberg & Schmidt, 2017, p. 907 ) and take it into account when legislating (Davies, 2016, p. 846) . However, as argued below, the institutions' proposals are not always in line with the CJEU's judgments. In such instances, the judgments of the CJEU are still analysed but rather as a consultative institution instead of its traditional judicial role.
As such, the CJEU's judgments are treated as mere institutional positions on given points.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I sketch the historical background of Regulation 1049/2001
and the revision process. Secondly, I provide a literature review of the academic pieces on the topic of transparency and European public access to information. Then, the body of the paper is divided into three main parts. Each part is devoted to one of the components mentioned above. The conclusion draws the various lines of reasoning together.
Historical Developments
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 marked an important step in strengthening the democratic credentials of the European Union's institutions. The Lisbon Treaty has even added a section to the Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter 'TEU') on democratic principles which are applicable to all areas involving Union action. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced various reforms aimed at consolidating the principles of good governance, transparency and open decision-making. Before these reforms, the TEU already contained a 'public right of access to documents held by the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies' in Art. 15(3). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (which by virtue of Art. 6(1) enjoys Treaty status) further provides for a right to access documents in Art.
42. However, it needs to be noted that this right of the Charter is limited concerning access to documents held by the EP, Council and Commission and thus provides a more restricted scope.
The principle of open decision-making and the right to access to documents as enshrined in Art.
15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 'TFEU') were mainly implemented through Regulation 1049/2001. It appears from Art. 1(a) of this Regulation that its main governing principle is 'to ensure the widest possible access to documents'. Art. 4 then provides for four exceptions to this main principle which the institutions may rely upon to deny access to certain documents (Chalmers et al., 2014, pp. 414-415) . However, in line with the principle of 'widest possible access', the CJEU held in its case law that these exceptions must be interpreted and applied narrowly (Case C-280/11 P Council v Commission also drafted an explanatory memorandum in which it explained the amendments it suggested.
In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission addressed the EP's recommendations but turned down some of them. These rejections pinpointed the beginning of a profound disagreement between the Commission and the EP. In addition to addressing the EP's recommendations, the Commission proposed At the time of writing, the position of the Council is needed to further proceed with this proposal.
While the position of the Council is similar to that of the Commission, the disagreement with the EP persists and has led to a complete impasse. It has been years since the beginning of the debate regarding the revision of the Regulation started, yet the process has grinded to a complete standstill (European Parliament Legislative Train, 2018).
Literature Review and Methodology

Literature Review
As the right to access public documents is a derivation of the principle of transparency, the literature on the latter is explored to make the link between the right to access public documents and transparency clearer. In the last couple of years, transparency has received a lot of academic attention. Traditionally, two distinct approaches have marked the study of transparency. Some scholars have explored transparency from theoretical and normative points of view. Such scholarship notably includes the study of normative relationships between transparency and other principles derived from democratic governance such as participation, accountability and legitimacy (Birkinshaw, 2006; Buijze, 2013; Fenster, 2015; Fox, 2007; Gaventa & McGee, 2013; Stiglitz, 1999) . This first approach to the study of transparency has one minor shortcoming. It focuses on theory, at the expense of practical examples of the application of the principle of transparency (Fenster, 2015; Hansen et al., 2015; Meijer, 2013; Meijer, Curtin, & Hillebrandt, 2012) . These pieces are general and assess transparency from a theoretical point of view.
Other scholars have opted for another approach by conducting specific case studies. Such studies explore specific pieces of legislation, their implementation and practical effects on democratic principles such as public participation, accountability and legitimacy (Birkinshaw, 2010; Calland & Bentley, 2013; Hazell et al., 2012; Hazell & Worthy, 2010; Mendel, 2008) . This second approach has been particularly instrumental to the understanding of public access to documents regimes and their practical effects on transparency-related democratic principles.
In line with this case-based approach, some scholars have studied the public right to access to EU documents that is governed by Regulation 1049 /2001 (Abazi & Tauschinsky, 2015 Buijze, 2013; Curtin & Meijer, 2006; De Leeuw, 2003; Dunin-Wasowicz, 2010; Héritier, 2003; Komanovics, 2009; Lenaerts, 2004; Peers, 2001; Roberts, 2002) . These studies are thus relevant for this paper since they pertain to public access to documents within the EU. However, in the cited pieces of work, Regulation 1049/2001 and public access to documents within the EU are treated as secondary issues. Recently, some important pieces were produced specifically dealing with the topic of this paper (Curtin & Leino, 2016; Leino, 2011; Harden, 2009 My paper adds to the existing literature by focusing on the differences of the institutions' positions.
The mentioned papers are used to establish the respective views of the institutions. However, the existing literature does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the divergent views of the institution. This paper attempts to fill this gap by taking a more holistic view and probing into the differences of opinion between the institutions involved and how these diverging views evolved. By tracing the revision process over a longer time frame, it is possible to see more clearly why public access is such a controversial issue and why the European institutions are having such a hard time reaching a consensus.
Methodology
This paper ultimately analyses two documents. First, the Commission proposal for a Regulation regarding public access to EP, Council and Commission documents (COM (2008)229). This document contains the proposed articles, as well as an explanatory memorandum. The Commission explains which reasons underlie its suggested amendments. This document is the primary source for the Commission's stance on the debate of public access to documents and is hence used throughout the paper in order to explain the The methodological approach used in this paper consists of a qualitative and textual analysis of the three sources. This paper aims to further the case-specific perspective on public access to documents within the EU. Since the positions of the two institutions are best understood via their proposals, an indepth textual analysis of these documents is the most appropriate technique to achieve the goals of this paper. The textual methodology serves to elaborate on the nuances in the literal wording of the legal provisions studied in this paper which consequently allows to shed light not only on the differences but also on the commonalities of the analysed documents.
Overriding Public Interest (hereinafter 'OPI')
Background to the OPI
Exceptions to the access to public documents are common in all legal systems. However, such exceptions must usually be balanced against the right of citizens to have access to documents. The institution holding the requested document must establish which of the interests prevail. If there is a public interest which overrides the reason for exception, the institution must disclose the document. Yet, in most systems there are so-called 'mandatory exceptions'. The specificity of these exceptions is that no public interest may override them. These are exceptions which typically include the protection of national security, defence, international relations and the economic well-being of a country.
However, in light of the growing importance of the debate on transparency, accountability and by extension the public right of access to documents, the existence of mandatory exceptions has been questioned. Indeed, in the latest international instruments on access to public documents, mandatory exceptions no longer exist. The application of all exceptions must always be subject to the OPI test (Deirdre & Leino, 2016, p. 6) . This international trend is apparent from the 2009 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, which all EU Member States have signed and some ratified (Deirdre & Leino, 2016, p. 6) . This Convention provides that all exceptions to the right to access (Art. 3(1)) must be balanced against a potential OPI (Art. 3 (2)).
Regulation 1049/2001
The currently applicable EU public access to documents regime contains a list of exceptions to the obligation to disclose documents. Art. 4 enumerates these exceptions. Similarly, Art. 4(2) provides a list of situations where institutions must refuse access to a document. These exceptions relate to situations where the disclosure of a document would undermine the protection of commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property rights, court proceedings and the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits. However, a fundamental difference exists between Art. 4(1) and 4(2). In the latter, the interests in non-disclosure of documents must be balanced against a potential OPI. This means that if there is an OPI in the disclosure of a document, the undermining of the listed interests is irrelevant and the document must be disclosed. In contrast, Art. 4 (1) makes no room for an OPI test. This paragraph contains mandatory exceptions. If the disclosure is deemed to undermine the interests protected in that paragraph, access is denied and no balancing exercise with another interest at stake takes place.
Art. 4(3), like Art. 4(2), provides a balancing of interest mechanisms. The provision provides a list of documents whose disclosure can be refused if disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process of an institution. However, this is qualified by the possibility that such interest is overridden by an OPI.
The Commission's proposal
The Commission and EP have differing views on the issue of the OPI. The Commission proposes to adhere to the current regime in its reform proposal with few amendments. One amendment relates to the form of the article. In the current Regulation, the OPI is mentioned in Art. 4(2), 4(3) and 4(4). In the Commission proposal, the reference to the fact that the OPI applies to exceptions under Art. 4(2) and 4(3) is only expressed in Art. 4(4).
Moreover, while keeping the current regime, the Commission has provided clarification on situations which are considered to constitute an OPI. The Commission adds in Art. 4(4) that an OPI is deemed to exist in cases relating to documents touching upon the commercial interests of a legal or natural person when the information relates to emissions into the environment. This is the only substantive amendment brought by the Commission proposal to the issue of the OPI. As a conclusion, the Commission fairly sticks to the current regime in this respect. Therefore, the OPI test only takes place under Art. 4 (2) and 4(3) but not under Art. 4(1).
Furthermore, the OPI is also relevant with respect to the disclosure of personal data. In the current Regulation, the issue of personal data is not specifically dealt with. However, in Art. 4(5) of its proposal the Commission deals with the disclosure of personal data (this matter is addressed in more depth in a subsequent section). In Art. 4(5), the Commission provides that personal information shall be disclosed 'unless disclosure would adversely affect the persons concerned'. Thus, the Commission does not provide for an OPI test when personal data are involved.
The EP's resolution
The EP disagrees with the Commission on this matter. In its resolution, the EP also subjects the exceptions under Art. 4(1) to the OPI test besides Art. 4(2) and 4(3). Subjecting these exceptions to the test means that the EP considers that there might be an OPI in the disclosure of a document, even where the so-called Furthermore, if the list of elements which are deemed to constitute an OPI under Art. 4(4) is closely examined, the reasons for subjecting the exceptions under Art. 4(1) to the OPI test become apparent. Indeed, the interests listed under Art. 4(1) could even be considered to be of a higher rank (the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law and the sound management of public funds). In most EU Member States, they have constitutional status (see for example, Clemons, p. 4). Thus, the EP expectedly provides for a balancing test against the exceptions listed under Art. 4(1). The EP thereby argues that the grounds stated are serious enough to justify the disclosure of documents even when the highest interests are at stake (those listed in Art. 4(1)).
Concerning the OPI involving personal data, the EP takes a different stance from the Commission.
The EP deals with the disclosure of documents containing personal data in Art. 4(5), as well. The threshold chosen by the EP is that of 'harm to the privacy or integrity of the person concerned, therefore, personal data should not be disclosed if such harm occurs. The provision goes on by providing three sets of circumstances when such harm is not deemed to be established. The EP then provides that even when there is harm to the privacy or the integrity of the person concerned, personal data could nevertheless be disclosed if an OPI requires disclosure. The EP sees the possibility of public interest overriding the interest of a person in their privacy. Such possibility is inexistent in the Commission's proposal.
The position of the CJEU
The CJEU has ruled on two main elements of the OPI test. First, the CJEU has ruled that a three-step test must be carried out in order to find an OPI justifying the disclosure of a document (Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council). Although this is an important contribution to the OPI test, this three-step test has not found its way in either of the institutions' proposals. The second element is that the CJEU has asserted that OPI was not applicable with regards to the exceptions under Art. 4(1) (Deirdre & Leino, 2016, p. 6) . For example, in the Sophie In't Veld case where the protection of international relations (under Art. 4(1)(a)) was raised as an exception to the right to access, the Court explicitly referred to the fact that in respect to Art. 4(1)(a), the legislator had not foreseen a balancing of competing interests (Case T-301/10 In't Veld v Commission, para. 90). The Court thus explicitly removed the possibility to claim competing balancing interests for Art. 4(1). In this way, the CJEU upholds the status quo since the Regulation does not provide any possibility to find an OPI when an exception under Art. 4 (1) is at stake. Therefore, the Court's position enables us to situate it closer to the Commission's proposal rather than the EP's resolution.
Conclusion
In conclusion, whilst the CJEU has been firm in maintaining mandatory exceptions and therefore exempting these exceptions from the OPI test, it could have taken the international developments on public access by the CJEU while interpreting the Regulation. Therefore, while the Commission's proposal is closer to the case law of the CJEU, the EP's resolution reflects the developing international standards more, which the EU Member States have agreed upon. At this point, it is hard to tell which direction will be eventually preferred. However, a harmonization of standards will be needed in the near future.
Protection of Personal Data
Background to the protection of personal data
On 25 May 2018, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became applicable. This instrument is the response to the growing (mis)use of personal data by private entities, and has in turn, generated a lot of debate. Data protection has been under the spotlight for several years now. Indeed, the development of online activities made the use of personal data very common on online platforms and concerns about the safe use of these data gained prominence over the last years (Goddard, 2017, p. 703) .
However, awareness about data protection did not render the right to public access less relevant.
Both rights are equally important. Indeed, both have fundamental right status. The right to data protection is incorporated in Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU while the right to public access to documents is enshrined in Art. 42. Thus, the question arose as to which right should prevail in situations where citizens request documents that contain personal information. This is an example of a clash between two fundamental rights and the institutions need to find answers on how to settle such a conflict.
Regulation 1049/2001
In the current Regulation, the protection of personal data is governed by Art. 1(b). This Article states that Because of these conflicting provisions, the question arose as to how the different interests at stake should be balanced in the event of a clash. When balancing the interests, one compromise was to blank out personal data in documents that were disclosed to the public. This practice has received particular attention by the Commission and the CJEU as demonstrated below.
The Commission's proposal
The Commission modified the protection of personal data regime by shifting Art. 4(1)(b) to the new Art. 
The EP's resolution
The EP endorsed the provision drafted by the European Data Protection Supervisor (hereinafter 'EDPS') who entirely redrafted the Commission's Article. While the Commission specifies the types of personal data that may be subject to the disclosure obligation, the EP merely refers to 'personal data' without specification. This choice of wording is designed to encompass more than solely what the Commission lists as 'personal data'. Furthermore, the wording of Art. 4(5) is surprisingly negative as if the default rule is that personal data shall not be disclosed and disclosure is the exception. The provision reads as follows:
'Personal data shall not be disclosed if such disclosure would harm the privacy or the integrity of the person concerned'. The provision continues by listing three sets of circumstances where harm to the privacy and integrity of the individual is not deemed to be caused.
First, it is deemed that no harm is caused if the data relate solely to the professional activities of the person concerned unless, given the particular circumstances, there is reason to assume that disclosure would adversely affect that person. The EP thus agrees with the Commission that particular circumstances can give rise to adverse effects on persons concerned when some personal data is disclosed. The second situation where harm is not considered to be caused is when the data relate solely to a public person.
However, the EP recognizes again the possibility that harm can be caused even where the data relate solely to a public figure. In this specific situation, the EP not only recognizes that harm can be caused when disclosure adversely affects the public figure in question, but also when it affects other persons connected with them. Lastly, harm is not deemed to be caused if the data have already been published with the consent of the person concerned. The provision ends with the already-mentioned issue of OPI. In this resolution, the EP abolishes mandatory exceptions and subjects all of them, including the protection of personal data, to the OPI test.
The position of the CJEU
The CJEU did not adjudicate on all the dimensions that are dealt with by the Commission and the EP in their respective proposals. However, throughout the years, the CJEU has been confronted with an important number of cases relating to the protection of personal data exception. The CJEU has ruled on different aspects of this exception which may not be directly reflected in the institutions' proposals.
However, a closer look at the case law makes it possible to assess which of the two proposals comes closer to the CJEU's interpretation of this exception. Moreover, after establishing the approach of the CJEU, the EDPS's input on the matter is assessed to put the institutions' respective positions into a wider perspective.
The CJEU has decided several landmark cases on the protection of personal data exception.
However, the Bavarian Lager is particularly interesting given the attention it has received by the Commission. In its proposal document, the Commission has criticized the practice of blanking out names and other personal data of individuals acting in their professional capacity when access to a document is given to the public. Thus, specific attention is given to this case to comprehend whether the CJEU stands 
The position of the European Data Protection Supervisor
The EDPS has voiced opinions on several points of the Bavaria Lager case. The EDPS has sided with the judgment of the GC and Bavaria Lager (Leino, 2011 (Leino, , p. 1239 and held views that run openly against the reading of the CoJ. It criticized the approach of the Commission to be too strict. The EDPS held that in order to refuse access to information that include personal data, the 'actual harm to privacy' threshold is always necessary (European Data Protection Supervisor, 30 June 2010). Therefore, the EDPS claims that not having the consent of the data subjects is not sufficient a ground for denying access to documents.
Actual harm must exist in order to justify such refusal.
Moreover, although the Commission's proposal has favoured openness in situations involving the protection of personal data more than the CoJ in the Bavarian Lager case, the EDPS has been critical of 
Regulation 1049/2001
The current regime deals with documents originating from Member States in Art. There are two elements in the article proposed by the Commission which deserve special attention insofar as they greatly limit its scope. First is the use of the conjunction 'or', and second is the word 'appreciate' in the second sentence of the provision. The conjunction 'or' limits the scope of the provision because it enables the Member States to invoke their own legislation as a justification for the refusal of the disclosure of documents. Member States are thus not bound by the exceptions under the Regulation but they rather enjoy tremendous discretion. This is likely to destroy the essence of the provision since Member States will be able refuse the disclosure of documents as they see fit by invoking national legislation.
Secondly, the use of the verb 'appreciate' strengthens Member States' power to prevent disclosure Indeed, only when there is doubt as to the application of an exception is there a need to consult the Member State authorities. Where there is no doubt, the authorities do not need be consulted. This gives great power to the institution since it has discretion to assess whether any doubt exists on the application of an exception.
Secondly, the EP denies the possibility for Member States to rely on national legislation to prevent the disclosure of the documents in question. The Member States may only rely on the exceptions laid down in Art. 4(1)-(3) of the Regulation to prevent disclosure. As shown above, this position is closer to that taken by the CJEU in its case law. Third, whilst the Commission suggests that after Member States give reasons to prevent the disclosure of the documents in question, the institution appreciates the reasons given by the Member State, the EP takes a different stance. The EP allocates a much stronger role to the institutions and greatly restricts the discretionary power of the Member State. The EP takes the view that the institution shall 'take a decision on the basis of its own judgment as to whether the exceptions cover the document concerned'. Thus, instead of an 'appreciation role' as advocated by the Commission, the EP favours a stronger role for the institution to give a decision based on its own judgment. Overall, Art. 5 (2) as amended by the EP gives less power to the authorities of the Member States to prevent the disclosure of documents originating from them and grants the institutions holding the documents more power to decide on whether those should or should not be disclosed.
The position of the CJEU
In a literal reading of Art. 4(5), the CFI ruled that whenever a Member State requests an institution not to disclose a document originating from it, the obligations of disclosure flowing from the Regulation are no longer applicable and public access to documents is then exclusively covered by domestic law (Case T- 
Conclusion
The CJEU has expressed that Art. 4(5) does not attribute a veto power to the Member States. Moreover, it has also been clear on the fact that national legislation cannot serve as an alternative to the exceptions listed under Art. 4 of Regulation 1049/2001. Consequently, the Commission has misinterpreted the judgment of the CJEU and thus proposed an article that is not in accordance with its case law. Meaning, the jurisprudence of the CJEU is closer to the EP's proposal than that of the Commission.
7) Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to offer insight into the elements that prevent the revision of Regulation 1049/2001. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 called for a revision of the Regulation, but nearly ten years later the revision is still nowhere. Through this paper, it became apparent that some fundamental divergences exist between the Commission and the EP on certain provisions of the Regulation.
The comparison of the proposals reveal two totally opposite views on transparency and the right to public access to documents. On the one hand, the Commission tries to implement a public access regime which hinders the least efficient of its decision-making process. For the Commission, the limits of transparency and the right to public access to documents extend up to the point where the administrative burden caused by the right to public access slows down the efficiency of the decision-making process of the institutions.
Thus, in its proposal, the Commission provides for a restricted framework of public access to documents.
The EP, on the other hand, has consistently favoured transparency at all costs. The EP is willing to slow down the decision-making process for the sake of transparency if necessary. This is reflected in the resolution it has adopted. The EP has indeed proposed a resolution that provides a very broad scope to the right of access to documents.
These two conflicting views were discernible in the analysis of the previous sections. In its proposal, the Commission has maintained mandatory exceptions. The EP, on the other hand, has extended the OPI to all the exceptions. While the Commission has advocated for emphasis on the right to data protection, the EP has endorsed the position of the EPDS in claiming a more balanced approach between the two rights so that the right to data protection is not given hierarchical prevalence and the right to public access is respected. Finally, while the Commission secures a veto right to Member States and the possibility to justify a refusal of disclosure by relying on national law, the EP merely gives a consultative role to the Member States while leaving the final decision on disclosure to the institution holding the document.
Besides the Commission and the EP, this paper provided some insight into the jurisprudence of the CJEU. The purpose was to set the institutions' respective proposals into perspective, given that the jurisprudence of the CJEU ought to be followed. If the institutions have incorporated some interpretations of the CJEU, they have not exhaustively codified its case law into their proposals. Consequently, it cannot be argued that the CJEU's case law is very close to either institution. The Commission and the EP have rather adopted the interpretations of the CJEU on an ad-hoc basis, when their views on public access was represented in the CJEU's judgments.
This paper attempted to provide insight into some concrete provisions of the Regulation on which the Commission and the EP cannot agree. Consequently, the revision process of the Regulation is currently at a standstill and there is no real prospect of resuming the negotiations. For a decade, hardly any agreement has been reached by the institutions. Despite the changes that are needed to clarify the meaning and scope of the provisions, the institutions cannot move forward. This is undesirable as it creates uncertainty and many challenges are going to be taken to the CJEU for its interpretation. However, the priorities of the Commission seem to differ from those of the EP. These differences on the interests that should prevail have contributed to the deadlock of the revision process. However, the urgency of the situation should motivate the institutions to review their positions and serve as an impetus to resume the negotiations and make this decade-long deadlocked instrument a new face of transparency within the European Union.
